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 This paper shows that an important link between investor sentiment and firm overvaluation is 
optimistic earnings expectations, and that management earnings guidance aids in resolving sentiment-
driven overvaluation. Using the firm characteristics identified by Baker and Wurgler (2006), we find that 
most of the negative returns to uncertain firms in months following high sentiment periods fall within the 
three-day window around management earnings guidance issuance. Comparisons of guidance months to 
non-guidance months show that guidance issuance affects the magnitude and not just the daily 
distribution of negative returns. There is also some evidence of negative returns around earnings 
announcements for firms that previously issued guidance, suggesting that guidance does not entirely 
correct optimistic earnings expectations. To provide additional insight into the strength of the guidance 
effect, we show that the market reacts more strongly to surprises and particularly negative surprises 
following high sentiment periods. Finally, firms with higher transient institutional ownership are less 
likely to guide and their guidance is less likely to contain bad news following high sentiment periods, 
indicating that managers with a short-term focus are hesitant to correct optimistic market expectations.
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THE PARTY’S OVER: THE ROLE OF EARNINGS GUIDANCE IN RESOLVING 
SENTIMENT-DRIVEN OVERVALUATION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Prior research in finance indicates that firms with high valuation uncertainty and/or 
arbitrage constraints are subject to overvaluation during periods of high investor sentiment. 
Specifically, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) show that younger firms, firms with lower market 
capitalization, higher return volatility, negative earnings, higher intangible assets, and lower 
dividends have lower returns in the months following high sentiment periods.1 Subsequent studies 
investigate the effects of investor sentiment on various market participants and find that sentiment 
affects managers’ real investment decisions and analyst earnings optimism (Polk and Sapienza 
(2009), Hribar and McInnis (2011)). This research also finds that sentiment can predict various 
stock market anomalies and is more likely to persist in stocks held predominantly by noise traders 
(Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Livnat and Petrovits (2009)). However, while most of these 
studies provide evidence consistent with stock overvaluation driven by either limits of arbitrage or 
investor irrationality, none of them demonstrate the process through which the market corrects the 
prior overvaluation. In this study, we examine whether earnings expectations play a role in 
sentiment-driven overvaluation by focusing on market reactions to management earnings guidance. 
Our results indicate that a great deal of the previously documented overvaluation resolves around 
management earnings guidance, which suggests that earnings expectations are indeed a culprit in 
sentiment-driven overvaluation.   
Understanding the underlying process linking investor sentiment to overvaluation provides 
insight into investor psychology and difficult-to-predict bull and bear markets. Currently, there are 
multiple possible explanations for why uncertain stocks are overvalued during high sentiment 
periods. For example, investors may exhibit different preferences, such as reduced risk aversion, 
during high sentiment periods, which would lead them to overpay for stocks with high valuation 
uncertainty. Under this scenario, in subsequent months, a general shift in investing trends or 
psychology would lead to the gradual decline in prices. Alternatively, investors may engage in a 
more detailed thought process that involves unrealistic expectations of future firm earnings, where 
there is more potential to overestimate future earnings for uncertain firms. Under this scenario, in 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we refer to firms that exhibit these seven characteristics as “uncertain” or “difficult to 
value”, and we use these terms interchangeably. 
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subsequent months, revisions in earnings guidance or other earnings news released by the 
overvalued firms should lead to predictable price declines. We focus on the second explanation, 
examining management earnings guidance to test the extent to which the correction of earnings 
expectations mitigates the overvaluation problem. 
In theory, if sentiment reflects investors’ irrational expectations about future earnings, then 
firm-specific earnings information should correct for investors’ expectation errors and reduce 
overvaluation. Consistent with this conjecture, growth stocks and stocks subject to high differences 
of opinion tend to earn significantly lower returns around earnings announcements (La Porta et al. 
(1997), Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice (2009)). However, prior investor sentiment 
research (Baker and Wurgler (2006)) finds only weak evidence that the average earnings 
announcement return is inversely related to sentiment for the subset of firms that are overvalued 
(undervalued) when sentiment is high (low). In addition, there is no evidence that earnings 
announcement effects are any greater than would be expected during a randomly chosen three-day 
window. We focus on returns around earnings guidance windows because these are important 
events which provide information to investors about firms’ expected performance, prior to the 
actual earnings announcement. It is well established that guidance events influence both stock 
prices and analysts’ opinions (Matsumoto (2002), Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner (2007), Choi, Myers, 
Zang, and Ziebart (2010)). Moreover, several recent accounting studies find that guidance events 
are more important than earnings announcements in conveying information to equity markets (Ball 
and Shivakumar (2008), Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010)).  
We use the First Call Company Issued Guidelines database to delve deeper into the process 
through which sentiment-driven overvaluation is resolved. Whereas previous studies (Baker and 
Wurgler (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Hribar and McInnis 
(2011)) examine the returns over the subsequent month or quarter depending upon prior investor 
sentiment, we examine the pattern of returns within those subsequent months. Specifically, we test 
whether the lower subsequent returns are concentrated around earnings guidance issued by 
managers of overvalued firms. Like previous studies of sentiment, we find that small firms and 
young firms, as well as those with high return volatility, high intangible assets, and low dividend 
payments, have lower monthly returns when prior investor sentiment is high. However, these 
returns are mostly contained within the three-day window around the issuance of management 
earnings forecasts. Roughly three-fourths of the predictable negative returns occur in this three day 
window, while the remaining fourth occurs over the other eighteen trading days in the month. 
Additionally, returns over entire months during which guidance was not issued are roughly half the 
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magnitude of three-day guidance window returns, again suggesting that guidance plays a strong 
role in price correction. We also find that the market is more sensitive to earnings surprises 
(particularly negative surprises) following high sentiment periods. However, results from 
additional tests suggest that managers’ attempts to preempt the earnings announcement are not 
always successful, as we still find some evidence that returns around the three-day earnings 
announcement window are significantly negative for small and loss firms, and firms with higher 
volatility following high sentiment periods. Moreover, consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006), 
we do not find any systematic evidence that sentiment-driven overvaluation resolves around the 
three-day earnings announcement window for firms that did not issue guidance. This pattern of 
results suggests that managers may intentionally issue guidance in an attempt to preempt negative 
earnings surprises, which could explain why sentiment-driven overvaluation does not resolve 
around earnings announcements. Consistent with prior work showing that transient institutional 
ownership induces earnings-related myopia (Bushee (1998)), we find that firms with higher 
transient  ownership are less likely to guide (and their guidance is less likely to contain a negative 
surprise) following high sentiment periods. 
Taken together, our results suggest that earnings expectations play a strong role in 
sentiment-driven overvaluation. In addition, investors do not appear to ignore bad news when 
firms are overvalued, but rather exhibit a stronger reaction to bad news forecasts following high 
sentiment periods. Our findings are important for understanding the nature of investor sentiment 
and earnings expectations, as well as the effects of management earnings guidance on the market. 
While prior research on investor sentiment investigates how various agents (managers, investors 
and analysts) are affected by investor sentiment, none examines the factors that resolve sentiment-
driven overvaluation. Our results indicate that investor sentiment does not lead to overvaluation 
through general beliefs or preferences such as shifts in risk aversion, but rather through firm-
specific earnings expectations, a finding which may be relevant to the formulation of hypotheses 
and research designs in future studies of investor sentiment and market bubbles. Our paper also 
expands upon prior research investigating the interplay of accounting information and investor 
sentiment (Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), Brown et al. (2009), Hribar and McInnis (2011)). 
Whereas these studies conclude that investor sentiment leads managers (analysts) to intentionally 
(unintentionally) bias their disclosures and forecasts, our study suggests that management 
earnings guidance plays a significant role in correcting optimistic market expectations, and thus 
that firm-specific disclosures also have beneficial effects. Finally, Berkman et al. (2009) find that 
earnings announcements reduce overvaluation in stocks subject to high short sale constraints and 
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high differences of opinion, or in other words in stocks for which valuation difficulty is identifiably 
high. Our findings suggest that earnings guidance events play an important role in mitigating 
overvaluation driven by a different source (investor sentiment), suggesting that earnings 
expectations likely play a broad role in overvaluation and that the disclosure of earnings-related 
information plays a broad role in mitigating this problem. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses our data sources and 
key variables. Section III presents our research design and descriptive statistics. Section IV 
discusses our univariate and regression results, and Section V concludes. 
 
2. Data Sources and Key Variable Definitions 
2.1 Sentiment and Characteristics Indicating Overvaluation 
 We utilize the monthly sentiment index constructed by the Michigan Consumer Research 
Center (MCRC). This measure is based on opinion surveys administered to households, and gauges 
their perceptions of financial well-being, consumer spending, and the strength of the economy. 
These measures are rated on a scale from 1 to 5, and are then combined by the MCRC to arrive at an 
overall monthly measure of sentiment. Prior work supports the use of this measure as a proxy of 
investor sentiment, as it is highly correlated with actual investor optimism (Qiu and Welch (2006), 
Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008)).2 We conduct cross-sectional tests in low and high sentiment 
periods using the seven firm characteristics identified by Baker and Wurgler (2006) as being 
linearly related to firm returns (size, return volatility, earnings, R&D, PP&E, dividends and age). As 
discussed in Section I, these characteristics proxy for valuation uncertainty and/or arbitrage 
constraints and hence predict sentiment-driven valuation differences. 
 
2.2 Earnings Guidance 
 We use management forecasts of future earnings available from the First Call Company 
Issued Guidelines (CIG) database beginning in January of 1996 (the first year used in the typical 
earnings guidance study due to the relative incompleteness of the data in years prior) and ending in 
December of 2006. We include both quarterly and annual earnings guidance. Because we have a 
monthly measure of investor sentiment, we match all forecasts made in month t to the investor 
                                                 
2 An alternative measure of sentiment introduced by Baker and Wurgler (2007) orthogonalizes macroeconomic 
factors. While six of the seven firm characteristics load significantly in the predicted direction using the MCRC 
monthly measure of sentiment, we find in untabulated tests that firm size becomes barely insignificant (p = 0.11) 
using the Baker and Wurgler (2007) monthly measure of sentiment (which is available only through 2005). The 
remaining five characteristics load significantly in the predicted direction using the Baker and Wurgler measure. 
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sentiment measure at t – 1. The database also identifies whether each forecast represents a positive, 
negative or zero surprise compared to the consensus analyst forecast. We use this variable for our 
surprise tests.3  We also require data to be available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT in order to calculate 
the guidance window returns, firm size, the book-to-market ratio, and six months prior cumulative 
returns, as well as the Baker and Wurgler firm characteristics which include (besides size), return 
volatility, earnings, R&D expenditure, PP&E, dividends and age. Moreover, we exclude observations 
where an earnings announcement is issued within the three-day guidance window to make sure 
that our results are not driven by market reactions to earnings surprises.4 These data requirements 
result in a final sample size of 31,360 management forecasts, which are issued by a total of 3,883 
firms.  
 
3. Research Design and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Design  
We examine the relation between investor sentiment and guidance window returns using 
the following model specification: 
 
	 
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The dependent variable, Car(-1, +1), is the raw return minus the CRSP value-weighted index 
cumulative over a three-day window around the issuance of the earnings guidance.5 Size is the log 
market value of equity at the end of the prior month. BTM is the firm’s book value of equity scaled 
by the market value of equity at the end of the prior month. Momentum is the firm’s market-
adjusted cumulative return during the prior six months. Sentiment is the decile-ranked MCRC 
sentiment index, and the key effect of interest is the interaction term, Sentiment × Characteristic, 
where Characteristic is one of the seven signals taken from Baker and Wurgler (2006). These 
characteristics take the form of binary variables for three reasons. First, three of the signals are 
                                                 
3 We include both quantitative and qualitative forecasts in our sample. Qualitative forecasts are forecasts where a 
company does not provide a specific numerical estimate of earnings. First Call classifies them as zero surprise 
forecasts unless management indicates that prior expectations are too high or too low. We include them because they 
are still likely to convey important information to market participants. 
4 In untabulated tests, we find that our results are robust to including guidance events where an earnings 
announcement was issued within the three-day guidance window. 
5 Returns and control variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to avoid the influence of outliers. Our 
results are qualitatively identical when we do not winsorize. 
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naturally binary (dividends vs. no dividends, positive vs. negative earnings, and R&D vs. no R&D 
because many firms have no R&D expenditure). Second, binary splits make it easy to compare the 
magnitude of monthly returns and guidance window returns across characteristics in our tables 
and figures. Third, the four remaining signals exhibit some correlation with sentiment itself, making 
interactions difficult to interpret. We rank these remaining characteristics (size, return volatility, 
PP&E, and age) by month to eliminate this correlation. The firm characteristics are defined as 
follows: Size is equal to one if the firm is above the median market value of equity at the end of the 
prior month, and zero otherwise. Volatility is equal to one if the firm is above the median in monthly 
return volatility over the prior six months, and zero otherwise. Loss is equal to one if the firm 
experienced negative earnings in the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. R&D is equal to 
one if the firm had an R&D expenditure in the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. PP&E is 
equal to one if the firm is above the median plant, property and equipment scaled by total assets in 
the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Dividends is equal to one if the firm paid dividends 
in the most recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Age is equal to one if the firm is above the median 
age in years (measured as the time since the firm first appeared on CRSP), and zero otherwise. All 
of our regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by month.6 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. The mean market-adjusted guidance window 
return is -2.8%, suggesting that earnings guidance lowers market expectations on average during 
the 1996-2006 sample period. The mean market-adjusted monthly return for the same period is -
2.7%. The mean book-to-market is 0.553 and the mean market-adjusted cumulative six month 
return (momentum) is 1.8%. As for the Baker and Wurgler (2006) characteristics, the mean return 
volatility over the prior six months is 0.124 and the mean of the binary loss variable is 0.175. All of 
these means are generally consistent with prior studies using a sample of guiding firms (Ajinkya, 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2005), Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008)). The remaining firm 
characteristics also seem reasonable. The mean R&D expenditure represents 3.2% of total assets, 
the mean plant, property and equipment represents 44% of total assets, approximately 42% of the 
firms pay dividends, and the mean firm age is 18 years. Also consistent with prior research, 
management earnings guidance is more likely to take the form of a negative surprise (Bergman and 
                                                 
6 Our results are unaffected by any of the following: 1. ranking Size, Volatility, PP&E, and Age into deciles, 2. factor 
analyzing all seven signals and using the first orthogonal factor to represent firm uncertainty, or 3. combining 
signals linearly into one composite measure using their decile ranks. 
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Roychowdhury (2008)). Negative surprises occur around 31% of the time while positive surprises 
occur around 12% of the time.7 
 
 [Insert Table 1] 
 
       Table 2 presents correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables. 
As previously mentioned, some of the firm characteristics are weakly correlated with investor 
sentiment. Ranking Size, Volatility, PP&E, and Age by month alleviates this issue. Interestingly, 
investor sentiment is also correlated with the surprise variables – high sentiment months are less 
likely to be followed by positive surprises and more likely to be followed by negative surprises.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The Effect of Sentiment on Guidance Window Returns Controlling for Characteristics 
We first examine whether investor sentiment and firm characteristics predict guidance 
window returns after controlling for size, book-to-market and momentum. As previously discussed, 
we use three-day cumulative market-adjusted returns centered on management guidance issuance 
dates. Results are displayed in Table 3 for all seven characteristics. For brevity, the coefficients for 
size, book-to-market, and momentum are not reported. The key effects of interest are the Sentiment 
× Characteristic interactions. To be consistent with prior research and theory, the expected 
interaction coefficients are positive for size, PP&E, dividends and age, and negative for volatility, 
losses and R&D. For six of seven regressions, the interaction coefficient is significant in the expected 
direction (the effect of loss is not significant). Because Sentiment is decile ranked and each 
characteristic is binary, the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of a one decile increase in 
investor sentiment on the three-day window return difference between low- and high-uncertainty 
firms. The effect of moving from the bottom to the top sentiment decile ranges in magnitude from 
roughly 1.8% for firm size to 4.14% for return volatility, with other characteristics falling in 
between. Interestingly, the coefficient on Sentiment is also negative and significant in each 
regression, suggesting that market reactions are generally more negative to earnings guidance 
                                                 
7 The remaining sample consists of forecasts that First Call identify as guidance issuances that do not qualify as a 
surprise, either because the firm forecast is equal to the prior analyst consensus, the range forecast contains the prior 
analyst consensus, there was no current analyst forecast to compare the firm forecast to, or the forecast was a 
qualitative forecast indicating that management was “okay with expectations.” 
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following high sentiment periods. These results suggest that earnings expectations play a role in 
sentiment-driven overvaluation. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4.2 Comparing Guidance Window Returns to Total Monthly Returns 
 To test the relative importance of earnings guidance in the months subsequent to high 
sentiment periods, we run the same regressions with returns outside of the guidance window (the 
remaining eighteen trading days in the month) on the left hand side and compare the interaction 
coefficients to the coefficients for the three-day guidance window returns. Table 4 displays the 
effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment on three-day guidance window (first column) 
and returns over the remaining eighteen trading days (second column) for each of the seven 
characteristics. Again, based upon the results of prior sentiment research (Baker and Wurgler 
(2006)), we expect guidance window returns to be more negative following high sentiment 
(compared to low sentiment) periods for these characteristic differences: small – big, high 
volatility – low volatility, loss – profit, R&D – no R&D, low PP&E – high PP&E, dividend nonpayer – 
dividend payer, and young – old. While the effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment is 
associated with a three-day guidance window return of -0.30%, the effect on the remaining 
eighteen trading days is merely -0.08%. We also compare the monthly short-long hedge portfolio 
returns for months without guidance issuance. The third column displays the returns for months in 
which no earnings guidance is issued by the same 3,883 firms over the 1996-2006 sample period. 
The average effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment is -0.16%, just over half the 
magnitude of the three-day guidance window effect, which reinforces the importance of guidance 
events in resolving sentiment-driven overvaluation. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
The plots in Figure 1 present the market-adjusted return patterns more tellingly. The 21-
day return window around guidance issuance is plotted for low- and high-uncertainty firms and for 
low- (below the median) and high- (above the median) lagged sentiment. As can be seen, the 
strongest negative guidance window return is uniformly concentrated in firms with higher 
uncertainty following high sentiment periods. While there does appear to be some evidence of very 
slightly lower returns for these firms in the first week, the most stark differences are concentrated 
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in the three-day guidance window. Following the guidance window, there is no clear difference in 
returns among the four groups. These results provide additional evidence that earnings 
expectations are a major link between investor sentiment and firm overvaluation. Once earnings 
guidance is released, the market appears to revert to more accurate firm valuations. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
4.3 The Effect of Sentiment on Earnings Announcement Window Returns Controlling for 
Characteristics 
 Thus far, our results are consistent with earnings expectations playing a role in sentiment-
driven overvaluation, and provide a plausible alternative explanation for why Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) only find weak evidence of overvaluation resolving around earnings announcement 
windows. If information that would otherwise be released via an earnings announcement is already 
communicated through the management forecast, then this suggests that there should not be a 
negative market reaction around earnings announcement windows for high uncertainty firms 
following high sentiment periods. Therefore, we examine returns around earnings announcement 
windows for both preempted and non-preempted earnings announcements in this section. We 
define (non)preempted earnings announcements as those (not) preceded by at least one 
management forecast prior to the three-day earnings announcement window. We replace the 
dependent variable in model (1) with EACAR(-1, +1) where EACAR(-1, +1) is the cumulative market-
adjusted three-day return centered around the earnings  announcement date. The results for this 
analysis are presented in Table 5. For brevity, we only present coefficients on the interaction terms. 
 The first row of Table 5 presents results for the sample of firms where the earnings 
announcement was preceded by at least one management forecast. Consistent with earnings 
guidance moving information forward that would otherwise be released at the earnings 
announcement, the returns are no longer significant for R&D, PP&E, Dividends, and Age. However, 
the results also suggest that small, high volatility, and loss firms earn significantly lower returns 
around earnings announcement windows. The second row of Table 5 presents results for the non-
preempted sample. While the coefficients are all in the expected direction, we do not find robust 
evidence that returns are significantly negative around earnings announcement windows for the 
seven firm characteristics. This may be because managers intentionally attempt to preempt bad 
earnings announcement news, such that the absence of earnings guidance is evidence of the 
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absence of unrevealed bad news.8 Taken together, these results suggest that while earnings 
guidance plays a role in resolving sentiment-driven overvaluation, managers are not always 
successful in preempting the negative reaction at the earnings announcement. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
4.4 The Effect of Sentiment on Market Reactions to Positive and Negative Guidance Surprises 
 The negative market reaction to guidance from high uncertainty firms following high 
sentiment periods suggests that market reactions to negative surprises may be stronger following 
high sentiment periods. To test this possibility, we use the following model: 
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PosSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance represents a positive 
surprise (higher than the prior analyst consensus forecast, as defined on First Call), and zero 
otherwise. NegSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance represents a negative 
surprise (lower than the prior analyst consensus forecast, as defined on First Call), and zero 
otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. All models use robust standard errors 
clustered by month. The key effects of interest are the sentiment by surprise interactions. If the 
market exhibits increased sensitivity to earnings guidance, the positive surprise interaction should 
be significantly positive, while the negative surprise interaction should be significantly negative. 
 Table 6 displays results for model (2). Positive surprises garner a stronger reaction 
following high sentiment periods as evidenced by the interaction coefficient, which indicates that 
each decile increase in sentiment leads to a 0.28% higher three-day return for positive surprises. 
Similarly, negative surprises also garner a stronger reaction following high sentiment periods 
which appears to be even stronger than the effect on positive surprises. The coefficient on the 
interaction term indicates that each decile increase in sentiment leads to a 0.64% lower three-day 
return for negative surprises. These results suggest that increases in investor sentiment will 
predominantly lead to stronger negative market reactions to earnings guidance. This result is 
                                                 
8 We examine management incentives to preempt bad news in high sentiment periods in section 4.5. 
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consistent with market earnings expectations being higher during high sentiment periods, and with 
negative surprises correcting the overvaluation that these expectations create.9 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
4.5 The Effect of Investor Myopia on Guidance Decisions 
 The prior section documents a statistically significant association between sentiment and 
market reactions to bad news earnings guidance. In this section, we examine whether managers 
have incentives to withhold bad news during high sentiment periods. Prior research suggests that 
there is a strong link between firms’ disclosure practices and their composition of institutional 
ownership (Bushee and Noe (2000)). For example, transient institutional investors who have 
shorter investment horizons invest more heavily in firms with more frequent disclosures because 
forthcoming disclosure practices reduce information asymmetry and lessen the price impact on 
trades. On the other hand, if management is aware that transient investors will immediately reduce 
their holdings when bad news is issued, then this may lead management to suppress bad news 
when earnings expectations are higher during high sentiment periods.  Consistent with this idea, 
Bushee (1998) shows that higher transient ownership induces managers to make myopic decisions 
in order to present more positive earnings news. To test whether investor myopia affects 
management guidance decisions, we utilize the following model: 
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Disclose is a binary variable equal to one if the firm issued at least one management forecast 
prior to the actual earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. Transient is a binary variable equal 
to one if the level of transient institutional investor holdings is above the median, and zero 
otherwise. We identify transient institutional investors using the Bushee (1998) classification 
method and measure institutional holdings at the quarterly level.  The first column of Table 7 
                                                 
9 In untabulated analyses, we also test whether guidance is more likely to represent a negative surprise for 
overvalued firms following high sentiment periods, which would also explain the strong effect of guidance reactions 
in resolving sentiment-driven overvaluation. Consistent with our expectations, we find that size and PP&E are 
negatively correlated with the issuance of a negative surprise while volatility and R&D are positively correlated with 
a negative surprise. Similarly, volatility, loss and R&D are negatively correlated with a positive surprise, while 
PP&E, age and dividends are positively correlated with a positive surprise. 
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presents the regression results for model (3). The coefficient on Sentiment is negative and 
significant = -0.0714, p < 0.01), consistent with Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008). Consistent 
with Bushee and Noe (2000), we also find a positive association between high transient 
institutional ownership and the likelihood of disclosure ( = 0.480, p < 0.01). Moreover, the 
coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative (" = -0.0301, p < 0.01), which suggests 
that firms with high transient institutional ownership are less likely to disclose when sentiment is 
high.  
To provide further evidence that management has incentives to suppress bad news when 
earnings expectations are high, we examine the effect of sentiment and investor myopia on the 
likelihood of good and bad news disclosures, and estimate a variation of model (3) with NegSurp 
and PosSurp on the left hand side. The results for this analysis are provided in the last two columns 
of Table 7.  The negative coefficient (" = -0.0271, p < 0.05) on the interaction terms suggest that 
high transient institutional ownership firms are less likely to issue guidance that is below prevailing 
analysts’ consensus in high sentiment periods. However, we do not find that they are more likely to 
issue good news when sentiment is high. Overall, these findings are consistent with investor 
myopia and optimistic market expectations influencing managers’ disclosure behavior. Firms with 
greater transient institutional holdings are less likely to provide (bad news) guidance to dampen 
earnings expectations when investor sentiment is high.   
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our results indicate that market reactions to management guidance are more negative for 
firms facing high uncertainty and/or arbitrage constraints following high sentiment periods. The 
three-day guidance window returns represent the majority of monthly negative returns. We also 
find some evidence that earnings guidance moves forward information that would otherwise be 
released at the earnings announcement, but does not always fully preempt negative earnings 
announcement news. In addition, the market reacts more strongly to negative surprises contained 
in earnings guidance following high sentiment periods, and managers are hesitant to correct 
market expectations when they have a myopic investor base. Taken together, these results suggest 
that optimistic earnings expectations play a strong role in sentiment-driven overvaluation and that 
earnings guidance plays an important role in mitigating this effect.  
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This study contributes to several streams of research. First, our results shed light on the 
market psychology behind sentiment-driven overvaluation, which should be relevant for future 
studies of investor sentiment and investor behavior more generally. We also contribute to the 
management guidance literature by showing that earnings guidance can correct market 
expectations at critical times.  Our results contrast with those of prior accounting research, which 
suggests that managers withhold their private information to exacerbate rather than attenuate 
overvaluation (Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008)), which should provide a more balanced 
picture to researchers in this area. Together, our results suggest that while managers may reduce 
their disclosure frequency during high sentiment periods, the disclosures actually help make prices 
more efficient by reducing overvaluation and resolving uncertainty. 
An important caveat to our findings and interpretation is that while prior finance research 
suggests that negative returns following high sentiment periods represent overvaluation, our 
findings do not necessarily imply market inefficiency beyond limits to arbitrage. As previously 
discussed, many of the valuation uncertainty variables are also posited to proxy for short-sale 
constraints (e.g., small firms with high intangibles and poor earnings), which would make arbitrage 
difficult during high sentiment periods.  
The results point toward a variety of directions for future research. Future studies could 
attempt to delve deeper into managers’ incentives to determine when guidance most contributes to 
resolving overvaluation, investigating the effects of stock option compensation, litigation risk, or 
information asymmetry. Research could also test whether firms who issue guidance during these 
critical periods benefit from increased future disclosure credibility in the eyes of investors. It would 
also be interesting to examine returns around other events that may influence earnings 
expectations, such as articles in the financial press or negative analyst forecast revisions. All of 
these issues may be fruitful topics for future research. 
 14 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev 
Car(-1, +1) 31,360 -0.028 -0.073 -0.010 0.032 0.132 
MonthRet 31,360 -0.027 -0.114 -0.017 0.063 0.200 
Size 31,360 13.682 12.404 13.562 14.877 1.858 
BTM 31,360 0.553 0.247 0.422 0.687 0.511 
Momentum 31,360 0.018 -0.197 -0.014 0.171 0.369 
Sentiment 31,360 94.673 88.800 93.700 102.700 8.564 
Volatility 31,360 0.124 0.066 0.100 0.155 0.111 
Loss 31,360 0.175 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.380 
R&D/A 31,360 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.068 
PP&E/A 31,360 0.441 0.171 0.375 0.634 0.344 
Dividends 31,360 0.418 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.493 
Age 31,360 18.096 5.000 11.000 26.000 18.677 
PosSurp 31,360 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.322 
NegSurp 31,360 0.305 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.461 
 
This table presents summary statistics for our dependent and independent variables. CAR(-1, +1) is the 
cumulative market-adjusted 3 day return centered around the earnings guidance issuance date. MonthRet 
is market-adjusted monthly return. Size is the log market value of equity at the end of the prior month. 
BTM is the firm’s book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity at the end of the prior month. 
Momentum is the firm’s cumulative marketed-adjusted return during the prior six months. Sentiment is the 
monthly MCRC sentiment index measure. Volatility is monthly return volatility over the prior six months. 
Loss is a binary variable equal to one if the firm experienced negative earnings in the most recent fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise. R&D/A is the firm’s R&D expense scaled by total assets during the most recent 
fiscal year. PP&E/A is the firm’s plant, property, and equipment scaled by total assets during the most 
recent fiscal year. Dividends is a binary variable equal to one if the firm paid dividends during the most 
recent fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Age is firm age. PosSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the 
earnings guidance is higher than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. NegSurp is a 
binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance is lower than the prior analyst consensus forecast, 
and zero otherwise. 
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Table 3 
 
The Effect of Sentiment on Guidance Window Returns 
 
These regressions test the effects of firm overvaluation in periods of low and high sentiment on guidance 
window returns after controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum. CAR(-1, +1) is the market-
adjusted 3 day return centered around the earnings guidance issuance date. Sentiment is the decile-ranked 
MCRC sentiment index in the prior month. See Table 2 for variable definitions. When interacted with 
Sentiment, Size, Volatility, PP&E, and Age are coded as one if above the median, and zero otherwise, while 
Loss, R&D, and Dividends are coded as a one when present and zero when absent. Robust standard errors 
clustered by month are displayed in parentheses. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p 
< .10, .05, or .01, respectively.  
Dependent Variable: CAR(-1, +1) 
Size Volatility Earnings R&D PP&E Dividends Age 
Sentiment -0.0056*** -0.0023*** -0.0044*** -0.0036*** -0.0062*** -0.0063*** -0.0064*** 
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Sent*Size 0.0020*** 
(0.0006) 
Volatility 0.0043 
(0.0035) 
Sent*Volatility -0.0046*** 
(0.0008) 
Loss 0.0060 
(0.0047) 
Sent*Loss -0.0011 
(0.0011) 
R&D -0.0021 
(0.0041) 
Sent*R&D -0.0022** 
(0.0009) 
PP&E 0.0023 
(0.0037) 
Sent*PP&E 0.0033*** 
(0.0008) 
Dividends -0.0013 
(0.0034) 
Sent*Dividends 0.0038*** 
(0.0007) 
Age -0.0005 
(0.0034) 
Sent*Age 0.0035*** 
(0.0007) 
Observations 31,360 31,360 31,360 31,360 31,360 31,360 31,360 
R-squared 0.038 0.043 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.042 0.041 
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Table 4 
 
Comparing the Effect of Sentiment on Guidance and Non-Guidance Returns  
 
 Effect of Decile-Ranked Sentiment  
Characteristic Three-Day 
Guidance Window 
Remaining Eighteen Days 
of Guidance Month 
Non-Guidance 
Month 
Size (small – big) -0.20% -0.03% -0.21% 
Volatility (high – low) -0.46% -0.23% -0.20% 
Earnings (loss – profit) -0.11% 0.10% -0.26% 
R&D (expense – no expense) -0.22% -0.05% -0.02% 
PP&E (low – high) -0.33% -0.12% -0.09% 
Dividends (nonpayer – payer) -0.43% -0.10% -0.17% 
Age (young – old) -0.35% -0.15% -0.15% 
    
Average Effect of  
Sentiment on Hedge 
-0.30% -0.08% -0.16% 
    
N 31,360 31,360 268,504 
 
This table presents the effect of lagged monthly sentiment and firm characteristics on market-adjusted 
returns, controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum. See Table 2 for variable definitions. All 
firm characteristics are binary variables as previously described. The first column displays the effect of a 
one-decile increase in lagged sentiment on guidance window returns. The second column displays the 
effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment on returns during the eighteen trading days outside of 
the guidance window. The third column displays the effect of a one-decile increase in lagged sentiment 
on monthly returns for months in which guidance is not issued (all months during the 1996-2006 sample 
period for the same firms during which no management guidance was issued). 
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Table 5 
The Effect of Sentiment on Earnings Announcement Window Returns 
 
 
This table presents regression results that test the effects of firm overvaluation in periods of low and high 
sentiment on earnings announcement window returns after controlling for size, book-to market, and 
momentum. The Preempted Sample includes a sample of firms that issued guidance prior to the earnings 
announcement. The Non-Preempted Sample includes a sample of firms that did not issue guidance prior to 
the earnings announcement. Each cell reports the coefficient on sentiment interacted with the firm 
characteristic. EACAR(-1, +1) is the market-adjusted 3 day return centered around the earnings  
announcement date. Sentiment is the decile-ranked MCRC sentiment index in the prior month. See Table 2 
for variable definitions. When interacted with Sentiment, Size, Volatility, PP&E, and Age are coded as one if 
above the median, and zero otherwise, while Loss, R&D, and Dividends are coded as a one when present and 
zero when absent. Robust standard errors clustered by month are displayed in parentheses. Coefficients 
marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p < .10, .05, or .01, respectively.  
 Dependent Variable: EACAR(-1, +1) 
 Size Volatility Earnings R&D PP&E Dividends Age 
Preempted 
Sample 
n=25,577 
       
Sentiment* 
Characteristic 
0.0007** -0.0011** -0.0026*** -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
        
Non-Preempted 
Sample 
n=86,158 
       
Sentiment* 
Characteristic 
0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0006* 0.0004 
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
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Table 6 
 
The Effect of Sentiment on Market Reaction to Positive and Negative Guidance Surprises 
 
  Dependent Variable: Car(-1,+1) 
Sentiment -0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
PosSurp 0.0469*** 
(0.0037) 
Sent*PosSurp 0.0028*** 
(0.0010) 
NegSurp -0.0668*** 
(0.0056) 
Sent*NegSurp -0.0064*** 
(0.0011) 
 
Observations 31,360 
R-squared 0.182 
 
These regressions test the effects of a positive or negative surprise in periods of low and high sentiment on guidance 
window returns after controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum. CAR(-1, +1) is the market-adjusted 3 day 
return centered around the earnings guidance issuance date. PosSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings 
guidance is higher than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. NegSurp is a binary variable equal to 
one if the earnings guidance is lower than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. Sentiment is the 
decile-ranked MCRC sentiment index in the prior month. Robust standard errors clustered by month are displayed in 
parentheses. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p < .10, .05, or .01, respectively. 
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Table 7 
 
The Effect of Investor Myopia on Guidance Decisions 
 
 Pr(Disclose=1) Pr(NegSurp=1) Pr(PosSurp=1) 
 
    
Size 0.2090*** -0.1510*** -0.0595*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0153) 
BTM -0.1020*** 0.0125 0.0459 
 (0.0211) (0.0336) (0.0488) 
Momentum -0.3730*** -1.1580*** 0.9850*** 
 (0.0511) (0.0735) (0.0620) 
Sentiment -0.0714*** 0.0362*** -0.0378*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0130) (0.0146) 
Transient 0.4800*** 0.1680** 0.1610** 
 (0.0360) (0.0722) (0.0696) 
Sent*Transient -0.0301*** -0.0271** 0.0017 
 (0.00663) (0.0126) (0.0132) 
    
Observations 283,936 30,842 30,842 
R-Squared 0.043 0.046 0.028 
 
These logit regressions test the effects of sentiment and transient institutional investor holdings on firms’ 
guidance decisions after controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum. Disclose is a binary 
variable equal to one if the firm issued guidance prior to the earnings announcement. PosSurp is a binary 
variable equal to one if the earnings guidance is higher than the prior analyst consensus forecast, and zero 
otherwise. NegSurp is a binary variable equal to one if the earnings guidance is lower than the prior 
analyst consensus forecast, and zero otherwise. Sentiment is the decile-ranked MCRC sentiment index in 
the prior month. Transient is a binary variable equal to one if the level of transient institutional investor 
holdings is above the median, and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered by month are 
displayed in parentheses. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p < .10, .05, or .01, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
